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Abstract 
What is considered to be fair depends on context.  Using a modified version of the 
Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and perceptions of fairness 
depend upon beliefs about what one ought to do in a situation – that is, upon normative 
expectations.  We manipulate such expectations by creating informational asymmetries 
about the offer choices available to the Proposer, and find that behavior varies 
accordingly.  Proposers and Responders show a remarkable degree of agreement in their 
beliefs about which choices are considered fair.  We discuss how these results fit into a 
theory of social norms. 
 
Keywords: game theory, fairness, social norms, normative expectations. 
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Behaving as Expected: Public Information and Fairness Norms 
Introduction 
 Social norms are often invoked as explanations of pro-social behavior.  Since 
norms are ubiquitous in society, it is important to be able to assess under which 
conditions individuals will be motivated to follow them, and to distinguish norm-
motivated behavior from generic social preferences.  To accomplish these goals, we need 
an operational definition of norms that allows us to make testable predictions about when 
norms will be followed, as well as to distinguishing norms from other concepts such as 
conventions or personal values.  In what follows we adopt a definition of norms that is 
grounded upon individuals’ preferences and expectations (Bicchieri, 2006, p.11).   
 For a social norm to exist and be followed, three conditions must be present.  
First, it is necessary that the individuals involved believe it exists and know the class of 
situations to which the norm pertains.  This condition implies that individuals must be 
aware they are in a situation in which a particular norm applies, since lack of awareness 
may lead to non-compliance.  We thus hypothesize that making a norm salient will lead, 
ceteris paribus, to more compliance (Cialdini et al., 1990).  The second condition is that 
individuals must have a conditional preference for following the norm.  Specifically, an 
individual will prefer to obey a given norm if she (a) expects other people to comply with 
it (empirical expectations) and (b) believes that other people expect her to obey the norm 
and may sanction transgressions (normative expectations).  The third condition is the 
presence of empirical and normative expectations.  It follows that an individual may not 
obey a norm she knows applies to a given situation if she fails to have the right kind of 
expectations.  Transgressions may occur because one observes non-compliance, or 
 4 
alternatively normative expectations are absent, or they are present but one can violate 
them without being observed. 
The conditional preference condition distinguishes social norms from personal 
values.  In the latter case, one usually has an unconditional preference for following a 
certain rule, as expectations about others’ compliance play little or no role in one’s 
decision.  Having a conditional preference for conformity also implies that one might 
follow a norm in the presence of the relevant expectations, but disregard it in their 
absence.  We thus hypothesize that manipulation of expectations will produce major 
shifts in norm-abiding behavior.  To test this hypothesis, we focused on a simple version 
of the Ultimatum game, in which one of the parties proposes a division of a fixed amount 
of money to another party who can then accept or reject the offer.  If the offer is rejected, 
both parties get nothing.  Experimental results show that participants’ modal and mean 
offers are 40 to 50% of the total amount, and offers below 20% are rejected about half of 
the time (Camerer, 2003).  These results are generally interpreted as showing that 
subjects have a preference for fairness (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).   
Our hypothesis instead is that subjects have a conditional preference for following 
fairness norms, and manipulation of expectations will lead to significantly different 
behavior among the same subjects in different conditions.  These results cannot be 
explained by a fairness preference hypothesis, since the material consequences are the 
same across conditions, and the only difference between conditions is the level of 
information (and thus the expectations) of players.  Furthermore, even if we were to 
modify the fairness preference hypothesis by making preferences conditional, it would 
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remain to be explained under which conditions preferences would change.  The theory of 
norms we adopt provides such a testable explanation.   
 To show that “fair” behavior is dictated by norms that are conditionally followed, 
we manipulated both salience and expectations.  In the salience treatment, we asked 
Proposers which of the options they thought Responders believed to be fair, thus focusing 
them on Responders’ normative expectations.  Our hypothesis was that making a fairness 
norm more salient would induce greater fairness on the part of Proposers.  In both the 
salience and non-salience conditions, we asked Responders which of the Proposers’ 
choice options they believed to be fair.  The goal of this assessment was twofold.  First, 
we wanted to check whether there was agreement in Responders’ normative expectations.  
Agreement strongly indicates the presence of a shared norm of fairness.  Second, we 
wanted to assess the agreement of Responders’ normative expectations with Proposers’ 
beliefs about them.  It is significant that Proposers’ answers (in the salience conditions) 
agreed with the overall Responders’ answers, a fact that further indicates the presence of 
a shared norm.   
What counts as fair may vary by context, and in a given context more than one 
fairness criterion might apply.  Equity and equality considerations may coexist, and 
randomization is often perceived as a fair allocation mechanism, as when we use a lottery 
to allocate transplant organs.  In our experiment, we added a choice option that 
randomized with equal probability between an equal and a very unequal share.  
Remarkably, a majority of Responders found this option fair, a finding also reflected in 
the Proposers’ beliefs about Responders’ assessments.  Adding this option allowed us to 
check for norm manipulation (Bicchieri, 2007).  That is, when a norm can have several 
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interpretations, individuals will tend to adopt the one most favorable to them.  This form 
of self-serving bias has been studied in the context of equity vs. equality interpretations 
of fairness (Frey & Bohnet 1995; Hoffman & Spitzer 1985), and we show that we can 
elicit the same bias with a suitable random option, provided this choice option is common 
knowledge among participants.    
To manipulate expectations, we changed the information conditions in three 
versions of the same division problem.  We expected a change in normative expectations 
to affect Proposers’ choices.  We also predicted the occurrence of norm evasion 
(Bicchieri, 2007):  whenever it was possible for Proposers to defy normative expectations 
without Responders’ knowledge, the proportion of unfair offers would be significantly 
higher.  Due to the conditional nature of norm compliance, the more ambiguous the 
choice situation, the higher will be the proportion of individuals that flaunt the norm, 
since their behavior cannot be clearly interpreted as intentional, and thus no sanctioning 
is expected to occur. 
Our paper is a contribution to a field that may be labeled behavioral ethics.  It 
should be seen as a subfield of behavioral decision theory, taking into account social and 
psychological considerations in an attempt to understand pro-social, “moral” choices.  In 
this regard, we explore whether and why a pro-social norm will be followed, trying to 
gain insights about decision-making and motivation that are useful for further developing 
a behavioral account of moral choices. 
 
Method 
Participants 
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One hundred and six college-age subjects participated in our study across 11 
experimental sessions. Advertisements specified that participants would earn 5 USD in 
addition to an amount that would depend on decisions made during the experiment.  
 
Game Paradigm 
Our experimental design employed a variant of the Ultimatum Game (Guth et al., 
1982), in which one participant, the Proposer, provisionally received a sum of 10 USD – 
provided by the experimenter – and then proposed a division of that money with a 
Responder. The Responder subsequently decided to accept or reject the proposal.  If the 
Responder accepted, both players received the amounts specified in the proposal.  If the 
Responder rejected, both players received $0. The Proposer chose from one of the 
following options: 
(5,5) - to propose $5 for the Proposer, and $5 for the Responder;  
(8,2) - to propose $8 for the Proposer, and $2 for the Responder; and 
Coin - to let the outcome of a fair coin flip determine the proposal: heads 
corresponded to (5,5), and tails to (8,2). 
Procedure 
Upon their arrival, participants randomly drew ID codes labeled A1, A2, , An and 
B1, B2, …, Bn, where n is twice the number of participants in the session, and proceeded 
either to Room A or B based on their codes.  We distributed and read aloud a set of 
instructions, which explained the following:  
• Based on random assignment, the participants in Room A were Proposers, and 
those in Room B were Responders.   
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• Participants would play three games,† each with a different person in the other 
room.   
• By means of a public randomization device, we would select two of the three 
games at the end of the study to determine participants’ cash payments.   
• For each game, we would post on the blackboard the Proposer-Responder pairings 
using their ID codes, distribute instructions specific to that game, and then 
administer a short quiz to test their understanding of the instructions. By posting 
pairings publically, we maximized transparency and the likelihood that each 
participant would believe he or she actually was interacting with three different 
people in the other room.    
• Subsequently, Proposers would be given a proposal form on which they would 
write their ID codes and choose one of the available proposals. 
• After all Proposers completed their proposal forms, an assistant would take them 
to Room B, where the Responders would mark their decision to accept or reject 
the proposal. 
 
Information 
 The proposal form that was used for each of the three games was determined by 
the information condition which we assigned to that game. Appendix B contains the 
proposal forms which differed slightly by information condition, as described below. 
In the full information condition, the proposal form listed all three options: (5,5), 
(8,2), and coin.  After Proposers completed their proposal forms, the experimenter in 
                                                 
† We described the games using the language of Hoffman et al. (1994). 
Comment [AKC1]: This addresses 
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Room B flipped a coin in front of the Responders in case any Proposer had marked coin 
on her form.  On any forms on which the Proposer chose coin, the experimenter then 
marked (5,5) or (8,2) based on the coin flip outcome.  The instructions explained this, so 
that prior to making their decisions, all participants understood that Responders would 
know if the Proposers with whom they were paired chose coin. 
In the private information condition, the Responder did not know that coin was 
available to Proposers, and Proposers knew this fact.  To create this informational 
asymmetry, we left coin out of the proposal form.  The experimenter in Room A 
explained to Proposers that they could indicate a coin choice by leaving both (5,5) and 
(8,2) unmarked; subsequently, the experimenter would flip a coin in Room A, and on any 
such forms, mark (5,5) if the outcome was heads, and (8,2) if the outcome was tails.  
Thus, Proposers understood that Responders were unaware that coin was an available 
option. 
In the limited information condition, both Proposers and Responders knew that 
coin was available, but also that Responders would not be able to infer whether the 
Proposer chose coin or marked one of (5,5) and (8,2) directly.  Specifically, the 
instructions explained that Proposers could indicate a coin choice by leaving both (5,5) 
and (8,2) unmarked on their proposal forms.  The experimenter in Room B would flip a 
coin and mark (5,5) or (8,2) accordingly on any such forms. Crucially, he would flip the 
coin behind a small screen, so that no participant could see the outcome.  Thus, all 
participants understood that the Responder would be unable to distinguish forms on 
which the Proposer chose (5,5) or (8,2) directly from forms on which the Proposer chose 
coin. 
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Finally, because Proposers did not receive feedback between conditions, and to 
minimize participants' confusion that occurred during a pilot study, we fixed the order of 
the information conditions as 1) full, 2) private, and 3) limited.   
Salience 
In each information condition, prior to making their choices, Responders 
completed a questionnaire that measured their normative expectations (see Appendix C). 
The questionnaire asked whether the responder found each of the three choice options 
fair. The questionnaire was aimed at assessing whether there was an agreement in 
Responders’ normative expectations, an indicator of (as well as a necessary condition for) 
the existence of a social norm.  In addition, roughly half of our experimental sessions 
included an incentive-based questionnaire for both Responders and Proposers, which they 
completed in each information condition, following the quiz but prior to making their 
choices (See Appendices D and E).‡  
These questionnaires asked participants about their beliefs about the percentage of 
Responders who indicated (5,5), (8,2) and coin, respectively, as fair options.  The 
questionnaires were designed to 1) make fairness norms more salient, and 2) test for an 
agreement between Responders’ normative expectations and Proposers’ beliefs about 
them.  The other half of the sessions included no such questionnaires; they just included 
the first Responders’ questionnaire (Appendix C).  We distinguish salient sessions which 
included these two extra questionnaires from non-salient sessions which did not. 
 
Design and Analyses 
                                                 
‡ For Responders in the salience condition, the second questionnaire in Appendix D was appended to the 
one in Appendix C.  
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The experiment used a 3 x 2 design, crossing three levels of a within-participant 
variable, information (full, private, and limited), with two levels of a between-participant 
variable, salience (non-salient and salient). The primary dependent variable was the 
Proposer’s choice: (5,5), (8,2), or Coin. 
We used a mixed-effects multinomial logit model to estimate choice probabilities. 
To determine the significance of information, salience, their interaction, and participant-
level random effects, we used nested model comparisons based on the likelihood ratio 
test statistic (LRT). Because small cell sizes made it inadvisable to base inference about 
the LRT on the chi-square distribution, we generated p-values for model comparisons 
using the non-parametric bootstrap. Bootstrap p-values lead to more accurate inference 
when cell counts are sparse. For the same reason, we generated p-values for the logit 
coefficients using the bootstrap. Appendix A contains additional details on the bootstrap 
methods we employed. 
 
Hypotheses 
We first hypothesized that, if there is a social norm, there must be agreement 
between Responders’ normative expectations and Proposers’ beliefs about them. We also 
hypothesized that choices would depend on information condition and salience. Based on 
the theory presented in the Introduction, we made several directional predictions by 
considering possible scenarios involving relevant fairness norms. 
Firstly, we predicted that the proportion of coin choices would be higher in the 
full information condition than in the private or limited conditions.  This follows because 
in the private information condition, there are no normative expectations for coin (as the 
Deleted: To correct p-values for 
multiple comparisons, we used Buja & 
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simultaneous inference. 
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availability of coin is unknown to Responders), and there should therefore be very few 
coin choices, since an outcome of (8,2) is likely to be rejected as unfair.  In the limited 
condition, Responders could not determine whether the Proposer chose coin.  Therefore 
the expected utility of coin is a combination of the probability of getting (5,5) or (8,2), 
and the probability that (8,2) will be accepted.§  If the Proposer assesses a probability 
greater than 5/8 that (8,2) will be accepted, she will choose (8,2).  If the probability is less 
than 5/8, the Proposer will choose (5,5).  Only if the probability is exactly 5/8, the 
Proposer will be indifferent among the three options.  Therefore, Proposers who believed 
that less than 62.5% of Responders would accept (8,2) would choose (5,5), since the 
expected value of choosing (8,2) would be less than 5.  Proposers who believed that more 
than 62.5% of Responders would accept (8,2) would choose (8,2), since the expected 
value of choosing (8,2) would be more than 5.  In either case, there will be few or no coin 
choices.  Finally, in the full information condition, as long as there were Proposers who 
though that choosing coin was perceived to be fair by Responders, the proportion of coin 
choices would be positive.  This is because these Proposers believe that the expected 
utility of choosing coin is 6.5, while the expected utilities of choosing (5,5) or (8,2) are, 
respectively, 5 and 0.  This is an example of norm manipulation; i.e., participants would 
adopt the (allegedly shared) interpretation of fairness that would benefit them the most.  
Indeed, coin maximizes expected monetary payoff without violating fairness.  
 Secondly, we predicted that there would be more (8,2) choices in the limited than 
in the full or private information conditions, because some Proposers would take 
                                                 
§ The expected utility of coin is equal to ½(5) + ½ (8)p.  p is the probability that the Responder will accept 
(8,2) because he believes that the Proposer is ‘playing fair’ and thinks coin is a fair choice.  The expected 
utility of (5,5) is 5, and the expected utility of (8,2) is 8p.  The value of p that makes one indifferent 
between the three options is 5/8, or .625.  
 13 
advantage of the ambiguity of their choice.  Specifically, if some Proposers believed that 
a large enough fraction of Responders thought that choosing coin was fair and that 
Proposers were playing fair by choosing Coin, then these Proposers could evade the norm 
and maximize their monetary expected value by choosing (8,2) in the limited information 
condition.**  Thus, the proportion of (8,2) choices should be higher in the limited 
information condition than in the full information condition.  In the private information 
condition, we expected the fraction of (8,2) choices to be low for reasons discussed 
below. 
 Thirdly, we predicted that there would be more (5,5) choices in the private than in 
the full or limited information conditions.  Previous work has indicated that the 
proportion of (5,5) choices is around 70% when (5,5) and (8,2) are the only available 
options (Falk et al., 2000).  Because the private information condition is most similar to 
this situation, and we expected (5,5) to be almost universally considered fair, we expected 
similar proportions of (5,5) choices.  In the full information condition, because we 
expected a relatively larger number of coin choices (due to norm manipulation), we 
expected fewer (5,5) choices.  In the limited information condition, because we expected 
a relatively larger number of (8,2) choices (as the ambiguity of choices led to norm 
evasion), we expected fewer (5,5) choices.  
Finally, because we expected the questionnaire in the salient condition to focus 
Proposers on fairness – i.e., on choosing either (5,5) or coin, and not (8,2) – we predicted 
that the above effects would be amplified. 
Results 
                                                 
** That is, p must be greater than .625 for a Proposer to choose (8,2) in the limited condition.   
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Choices by Information and Salience 
Figure 1 shows the choice proportions for each level of Information x Salience. 
As salience effects appeared to be small, we averaged across salience conditions in 
reporting the choice proportions below. 37.7% (20/53) of Proposers chose coin in the full 
information condition, compared to 11.3% (6/53) in the private condition and 5.7% 
(3/53) in the limited condition, consistent with our first hypothesis. Consistent with our 
second hypothesis, more Proposers chose (8,2) in the limited condition (58.5% [31/53]) 
than in the full (24.5% [13/53]) or private (37.7% [20/53]) conditions. We observed the 
highest frequency of (5,5) choices in the private condition (50.9% [27/53]) relative to the 
full (37.7% [20/53]) and limited (35.8% [19/53]) conditions, consistent with our third 
hypothesis.  
The primarily additive effect of salience combined with differences in choice 
proportions across information conditions suggests the presence of both main effects, but 
not their interaction. Indeed, nested model comparisons (see Table 1) confirmed that a 
model with main effects of information and salience – but not their interaction – fit the 
choice data the best. Participant-level random effects were not significant for any of the 
models in Table 1. 
Table 2 shows the estimates for the model with both main effects of information 
and salience. Consistent with a norm-based explanation of choices, when normative 
expectations for coin are either absent (in the private condition) or can be defied without 
consequence (in the limited condition), the predicted probabilities of (5,5) and (8,2), 
respectively, are considerably higher than those of coin. This is indicated by the 
significantly positive coefficients.  On the other hand, when normative expectations for 
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coin are present and choices are transparent (in the full information condition), (5,5) is no 
more likely than coin (p = .963), whereas (8,2) is in fact less likely (p = .038).  The 
substantial discrepancy between some of the maximum likelihood (ML) and bootstrap 
estimates of the standard error were due to right-skewed coefficients distributions; 
accordingly, we used percentiles of the bootstrap distribution to calculate p-values, 
instead of relying on the asymptotic normality of the coefficients. 
Based on the model with both main effects, we performed formal tests of our first 
three hypotheses using bootstrapping to generate p-values (see Appendix A). As 
suggested by Figure 1, the probability of coin was significantly higher in the full 
information condition than in the private or limited information conditions (p < .001, for 
both the salient and non-salient conditions). (8,2), additionally, was more likely to be 
chosen in the limited condition than in the full or private information conditions (p < .02, 
for both the salient and non-salient conditions). (5,5), however, was not more likely to be 
chosen in the private condition than in the other other two conditions (p = .1 and p = .2 
respectively for the salient and non-salient conditions). Thus, we found support for our 
first two hypotheses but not for our third. 
We found mixed support for our final set of hypotheses, that Proposers would be 
more focused on fairness in the salient condition and would therefore be more likely to 
choose (5,5) and coin, and less likely to choose (8,2). Respectively in the salient and non-
salient conditions, there were 41 and 25 (5,5) choices (p = .003); 17 and 12 coin choices 
(p = .2); and 26 and 38 (8,2) choices (p = .016), where again we generated bootstrapped 
p-values using the model with both main effects. Because the interaction between 
salience and information was not significant (see Table 1), the norm-focusing effects 
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reported above were limited to across information conditions.  
 
Normative Expectations and Beliefs about Them 
Table 3 reports the normative expectations of Responders. Clearly, almost all 
Responders considered (5,5) to be fair in all information conditions, and a majority of 
them also thought that Coin was fair. This may be surprising because the expected utility 
of Coin is only 3.5 USD for the Responder, whereas it is 6.5 USD for the Proposer. A 
possible explanation is that using a random device is perceived as a fair way to choose 
between alternatives. Responders might have compared Coin to the temptation of (8,2) 
and found the Proposer who refused to choose between (5,5) and (8,2) as one making a 
fair choice. Alternatively, some might have thought the Proposer, because of her role, had 
an entitlement to a greater share, and Coin seemed a fair compromise between five 
dollars and eight dollars.   
Figures 2-4 show participants’ beliefs about Responders’ normative expectations 
for each information condition. There is a remarkable degree of agreement between 
Responders’ and Proposers’ beliefs about the normative expectations of Responders.  
Moreover, a comparison of Table 3 with Figures 2-4 shows that participants’ beliefs 
about normative expectations are in agreement with the normative expectations 
themselves.  
Such high degree of agreement is the strongest possible indication that there is a 
shared norm of fairness. Not only is (5,5) universally perceived as fair, but also Coin is 
thought to be fair by a majority of participants. This agreement explains the tendency to 
choose a self-serving interpretation of fairness (norm manipulation) in the full 
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information condition, as well as the pattern of choices across information conditions, as 
we show in the following section.  
 
Choices as a Function of Beliefs about Normative Expectations 
A social norm explanation presupposes consistency between beliefs and behavior. 
In particular, it requires consistency between participants’ beliefs about normative 
expectations and their subsequent choices. As we show below, the data show a high 
degree of consistency between beliefs and behavior. 
We denote the Proposers’ belief about the proportion of Responders who consider 
(5,5), (8,2), and coin, respectively, as being fair by ϕ (5,5), ϕ (8,2), and ϕ (coin).  The 
distributions of these variables are summarized by Figures 2-4. To determine whether 
these beliefs could explain the variance in Proposer’s choices, we fit a multinomial logit 
with information condition and the three questionnaire variables as predictors, based on a 
stepwise search.††  The signs of the coefficients for the questionnaire variables were in 
the appropriate directions (see Table 4).  As the Proposer’s belief that the Responder 
considered (5,5) to be fair increased, (8,2) became less likely relative to the reference 
choice of coin (p = .068).  As ϕ (coin) increased, the odds of choosing coin over (5,5) 
increased as well (p = .048).  For higher levels of ϕ (8,2), coin was less likely than (8,2) 
(p = .068).  
Figures 5a-b show the predicted probabilities of (8,2) choices by condition as 
                                                 
†† We used a stepwise search that minimized Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), a function of the 
likelihood which penalizes larger models (AIC = -2(log-likelihood) + 2k, where k is the number of 
parameters in the model that are being estimated).  The scope of the model search were information, ϕ (5,5), ϕ (8,2), and ϕ (coin).  When we expanded the scope to search amongst all two-way interactions 
as well, AIC selected a model which included ϕ (8,2) xϕ (coin) in addition to the variables in Table 4 
(AIC=158.61).  However, we chose to present the simpler model without this interaction term, as it did not 
change our substantive results, and Figures 6-7 looked the same with or without it. 
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functions of ϕ (8,2) and ϕ (Coin), respectively. In the private information condition, for 
example, a Proposer who believes that no Responders find (8,2) to be fair (i.e., ϕ (8,2) = 
0) has a predicted probability of .23 of choosing (8,2)  -- see Figure 5a.‡‡ However, a 
Proposer who believes that roughly 60% of Responders find (8,2) to be fair is more than 
twice as likely to choose (8,2), with a predicted probability of .55. 
The strong dependency of (8,2) choices on the Proposer’s belief that Coin is 
considered to be fair in the limited information condition (see Figure 5b) is also 
noteworthy. A Proposer who believes that no Responders find Coin to be fair has a 
predicted probability of only .10 of choosing (8,2). However, a Proposer who believes 
that all Responders find Coin to be fair has a predicted probability of .53 of choosing 
Coin, a five-fold increase. This occurs because the Proposer can choose (8,2) with 
impunity when the Proposer’s estimate of the probability that Coin is considered fair by 
Responders is high.  If the Proposer believes that a) the Responder thinks Coin is fair and 
b) the Responder believes that the Proposer is playing fair by choosing Coin, then (8,2) is 
expected to be accepted with high probability because it will be interpreted as the 
unlucky outcome of a coin flip. Moreover, as Figure 5b shows, the predicted probability 
of (8,2) choices in the limited information condition increases with the Proposer’s 
estimate of the probability that Coin is considered fair by Responders. Whereas the 
existence of more than one interpretation of fairness leads to norm manipulation (i.e., the 
Proposer chooses Coin instead of (5,5) in the full information condition), the presence of 
ambiguity leads to norm evasion (i.e., the Proposer chooses (8,2) in the limited 
information condition because the source of the offer is not identifiable as being 
                                                 
‡‡ The other belief variables are held fixed at their median values for these predictions. 
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intentional or due to chance). Indeed, 76% of Proposers choose (8,2) in the limited 
information condition. And even when Proposers are focused on fairness in the salience 
condition, the proportion of (8,2) choices is relatively high.  
 Finally, Figure 6 shows the predicted probability of Coin choices as a function of 
ϕ (Coin) by condition. Clearly, the probability of choosing Coin increases with the 
Proposer’s estimate of the proportion of Responders who consider Coin to be fair. As 
mentioned earlier, the Proposer’s self-serving bias would lead to a greater frequency of 
Coin choices whenever it is clear that Responders know that Coin has been chosen and 
that they consider Coin to be fair.  This can also be seen in Figure 1, where the proportion 
of Coin choices in the full information condition is substantially larger relative to the 
other information conditions.  
 
Responder Behavior 
Table 5 shows that Responders discriminated between intentional offers and offers that 
were generated by a chance mechanism. In the full information condition, no (8,2) offers 
resulting from a Coin choice were rejected, whereas intentional (8,2) offers were rejected 
23% of the time. Responders’ rejection rates of (8,2) were also sensitive to the presence 
of an intermediate choice. In the private information condition, in which Responders 
believe the only choices are (5,5) and (8,2), the rejection rate is much higher than in the 
full information condition (40% vs. 23%), in which Responders know that the Coin 
choice is available. When there is ambiguity as to the source of the choice, as in the 
limited information condition, the rejection rate of (8,2) was low (16.1%). This suggests 
that the large majority of Responders who receive an (8,2) offer in the limited 
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information condition believe both that it is the result of a Coin choice and that choosing 
Coin is fair. The large number of Proposers who choose (8,2) in the limited information 
condition seem to expect this low rate of rejections. 
  
Conclusions 
 Having a well-defined, testable theory of social norms allows us to explain what 
would prima facie appear to be inconsistencies in individual behavior. Individuals choose 
to be fair on occasion, but revert to selfish behavior on others. The theory of social norms 
we adopt explains away these apparent inconsistencies. Compliance with a norm is 
conditional upon having the right kind of empirical and normative expectations.  It is also 
important that individuals focus on the relevant norm in order for them to comply with it. 
The theory of we adopt (Bicchieri, 2006) predicts that making a norm salient will tend to 
increase compliance and, even more important, that the presence of the appropriate 
expectations is crucial for attaining conformity to the norm. We thus expected that 
manipulating expectations by changing the information available to individuals would 
result in large shifts in behavior.  
The data we presented highlight two important phenomena connected to norm 
compliance. The first is norm manipulation (Bicchieri, 2007): when a norm can have 
several interpretations, individuals will tend to choose the interpretation that best serves 
their interests. This effect is evident in the choice of Coin in the full information 
condition. In this condition, the participants have common knowledge of the Proposer’s 
access to the three choices of (5,5), (8,2), and Coin, as well as the Responder’s ability to 
differentiate between an intentional unfair offer and an unfair offer resulting from a 
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chance event. In the full information condition, the proportion of coin choices is the same 
as the proportion of (5,5) choices. Moreover, this manipulation of the fairness norm is 
made possible by the implicit and strong agreement among the Responder’s normative 
expectations about the fairness of Coin choices and both Proposers’ and Responders’ 
agreement about such normative expectations. As we mentioned at the outset, such an 
agreement is a strong indication of the presence of a shared norm.  
 The second phenomenon is norm evasion. Norm evasion differs from norm 
avoidance, in which an individual avoids a specific situation to which a norm applies.  A 
vivid example of norm avoidance is the behavior of the Iks described by Turnbull (1972). 
The Iks repaired their huts in the middle of the night so as to avoid their neighbors’ offers 
of help, as such offers had to be accepted, and that involved incurring an obligation that 
the beneficiary wanted to avoid.  Norm evasion, on the contrary, is the deliberate, private 
flouting of a norm even if one knows the normative expectations of the relevant parties. 
For many individuals, the presence of normative expectations without the sanctioning 
element weakens the grip of the norm.  Such expectations can be violated at no cost, as 
the victim will not be able to distinguish an intentional action from a chance event. Norm 
evasion explains Proposers’ behavior in the limited information condition, in which (8,2) 
was the most frequent choice.  
 Our work introduces the field of behavioral ethics and builds on the seminal work 
of Guth et al. (1982) and Hoffman et al. (1994), who showed the importance of context in 
games requiring the division of resources.  We add to that work by showing that the 
effect of context is mediated by the role that normative expectations and shared norms 
hold in explaining behavior. Secondly, our measurement of first-order (Responders’ 
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fairness judgments) and second-order (Proposers’ and Responders’ beliefs about 
Responders’ fairness judgments) beliefs is a highly useful but underused method in 
experiments on strategic interactions.  Thirdly, our results potentially allow us to 
distinguish between different types of individuals. Future work will explore how a more 
fine-grained account of individuals’ sensitivity to specific norms explains their choices, 
and whether there are correlations between sensitivities to different norms, such as those 
of cooperation, fairness, and reciprocity. Strong correlations would indicate the existence 
of a general disposition to follow social norms, whereas a low correlation would indicate 
that norm compliance is a local, norm-specific phenomenon.  
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Appendix A: Statistical Methods 
Rationale for Statistical Methods 
To evaluate our hypotheses and predictions, traditional approaches using the 
general linear model or the chi-square test for independence are inadequate for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, our data contain multiple responses from each participant. If these 
responses were substantially correlated, the standard error estimates produced by 
traditional methods would be too small. Secondly, four of the eighteen cells (3 choices x 
3 information conditions x 2 salience treatments) in our data had counts of less than five, 
making inference based on asymptotic results unadvisable.  
The Bootstrap 
Asymptotically, logit coefficients and the LRT follow known distributions (under 
general regularity conditions). However, this is not true for small samples. The bootstrap 
distribution of a statistic can be used to check the validity of basing inference on 
asymptotic results. Roughly half of the coefficients in the multinomial logit models we 
estimated had right-skew (and hence, non-normal) bootstrap distributions, and the 
majority of the bootstrap distributions of the LRTs were not chi-square. Had we relied on 
traditional analyses based on the normal and chi-square distributions, our standard error 
estimates and p-values would have been too small. We provide details of our bootstrap 
methods below. 
Let yobs = (y1, y2, …, yn) denote the vector of observed data, let T(yobs) denote the 
statistic of interest, and let F denote the underlying distribution that generated the data. 
The bootstrap estimates F using yobs, thereby producing an estimate, F^, of the 
distribution of T(yobs). The non-parametric bootstrap estimates F^ as the distribution 
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generated by random sampling with replacement from the set of observed data points, 
{y1, y2, …, yn}. The parametric bootstrap estimates F^ by estimating the model’s free 
parameters and then sampling from the assumed distribution conditional on its 
parameters being fixed at their estimated values. Using either nonparametric or 
parametric bootstrap, one generates a bootstrap data set, y, by taking n draws from F^. 
The quantity T(y) is the bootstrap estimate of T(yobs), and the distribution of T(y) is its 
bootstrap distribution. Letting y1, y2, …, yn be n bootstrap data sets, the standard error 
estimate of T(yobs,) is the standard deviation of T(y1), T(y2), …, T(yn).  
We produced each parametric bootstrap estimate based on the multinomial logit 
model by 1) fitting the multinomial logit model using maximum likelihood, 2) generating 
159 draws from the multinomial distribution with its parameters fixed at their maximum 
likelihood estimates from step 1, and 3) computing and recording the bootstrap estimates 
of the statistic of interest. We then repeated the above steps 9,999 times to determine the 
distribution of the statistic. The procedure for generating non-parametric bootstrap 
estimates is similar: 1) randomly select 25 Proposers in the control and 28 Proposers in 
the salient condition, with replacement, 2) compute the statistic of interest, and 3) repeat 
the previous two steps 9,999 times. 
To determine the p-value for each multinomial logit coefficient, we computed the 
smallest value of alpha for which zero was not contained in the confidence interval 
formed by the ( 2/*αn )th and ( )2/1(* α−n )th quantiles (sorted values) of the 
parametric bootstrap estimates of the coefficients, T(y1), T(y2), …, T(yn).§§  The estimate 
of the p-value is the proportion of bootstrap estimates that fell strictly outside this 
                                                 
§§ The decimal precision of this value is determined by the number of bootstrap replicates. 
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interval, which estimates the probability of drawing a coefficient more extreme in either 
tail of its distribution than the observed value.  Although the distribution of the 
coefficient divided by its estimated standard error converges in probability to the standard 
normal, this is not necessary true for small samples.  Thus, computing a p-value based on 
quantiles of the bootstrap distribution is preferable.  We determined the p-value for the 
LRT in the same way, except that we constructed a one-sided confidence interval by 
omitting the division of α by two, as we expected LRTs to be positive under the null 
hypothesis. 
We also used the boostrap to generate p-values for our hypothesis tests. For our 
first three hypotheses, we formed our test statistics by taking the predicted probability for 
the choice and information condition of interest, and subtracting from it the maximum of 
the predicted probabilities for the two other information conditions. For example, for the 
first hypothesis, that coin choices would be more likely in the full information condition 
than in the private or limited conditions, we subtract the maximum of the predicted 
probabilities of coin in the private and limited conditions from the predicted probability 
of coin in the full information condition. Because we expected this test statistic to be 
positive, the p-value was the proportion of bootstrap replicates that were negative. Test 
statistics for the last three hypotheses were formed analogously. 
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Appendix B: Proposal Forms 
Proposal form for the first game (full information condition) 
(1) Identification number (Proposer fills this out): ___________ 
(2) Paired with (Proposer fills this out): ___________ 
(3) Proposer’s choices (Proposer check one):  
       ___ $5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder  
       ___ $8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder 
       ___ Let a coin flip decide which of the above choices will be made. 
(4) Responder’s decision (Responder check one): 
       ___ Accept                      ___ Reject 
 
Proposal form for second game (private information condition) 
(1) Identification number (Proposer fills this out): ___________ 
(2) Paired with (Proposer fills this out): ___________ 
(3) Proposer’s choices (Proposer check one):  
      ___ $5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder  
      ___ $8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder 
 (4) Responder’s decision (Responder check one): 
       ___ Accept                      ___ Reject 
 
Proposal form for third game (limited information condition) 
(1) Identification number (Proposer fills this out): ___________ 
(2) Paired with (Proposer fills this out): ___________ 
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(3) Proposer’s choices (Proposer check one):  
       ___ $5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder  
       ___ $8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder 
         Let a coin flip decide which of the above choices will be made. 
 (4) Responder’s decision (Responder check one): 
       ___ Accept                      ___ Reject 
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Appendix C: Questionnaire 1 for Responders 
Item (3) of each block of questions was omitted for the private condition, because 
Responders did not know that the Coin option was available to Proposers. 
Questionnaire 
Your identification number: _____________ 
Please guess how many Proposers will choose:  
(1)      $5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder: _________ 
(2)      $8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder: _________ 
(3)      Let a coin flip decide:                           _________ 
If your guess is correct, you will earn a $1 bonus. 
 
Please mark any options you believe are fair options. You are free to choose none of the 
options, one, or more than one option. Your answer will not affect your payment. 
(1)      $5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder     [   ] 
(2)      $8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder     [   ] 
(3)      Let a coin flip decide                               [   ] 
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Appendix D: Questionnaire 2 for Responders 
Please guess how many Responders (excluding you) will select each of the options in the 
above question as fair options.  For each line on which your guess is correct, you will 
earn a $1 bonus. 
(1)      $5 for Proposer and $5 for Responder _________ 
(2)      $8 for Proposer and $2 for Responder _________ 
(3)      Let a coin flip decide                           _________ 
 31 
Appendix E: Questionnaire for Proposers 
The questionnaire item regarding the Coin option was omitted in the private condition, as 
Proposers understood that Responders thought the Coin option was unavailable in that 
condition. 
Questionnaire 
Your identification number: _____________ 
Each Responder was asked to decide whether the ‘$5 and $5’ option is fair. 
Please guess how many Responders selected this option as fair: ________ 
Each Responder was asked to decide whether the ‘$8 and $2’ option is fair. 
Please guess how many Responders selected this option as fair:_________ 
Each Responder was asked to decide whether the coin flip option is fair. 
Please guess how many Responders selected this option as fair:_________ 
Note that Responders may answer no to all questions or yes to one or more questions.  
For each line on which your guess is correct, you will earn a $1 bonus. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Model comparisons for information and salience. P-values are based on 
bootstrap quantiles (see Appendix A for details), and not the chi-square distribution.*** 
Null Alternative df LRT p 
- Null (N) - - - 
N Information (I) 4 25.73 < .0001 
N Salience (S) 2 6.54 .05 
I I + S 2 7.05 .04 
S I + S 4 26.23 < .0001 
I + S I x S 4 3.67 .52 
 
                                                 
*** The chi-square would have yielded the following less conservative p-values: 
respectively from top to bottom (see Table 2), p < .0001, p = .04, p = .03, p < .0001, and 
.45. 
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Table 1. Choices by Information x 
Salience. Percentages and fractions 
correspond to each row in the table. S 
stands for the salient condition, N for 
non-salient condition, and T for the total.¶
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Table 2. Multinomial logit model of information and salience as predictors of choices. 
Maximum likelihood (ML) and bootstrap standard error estimates are included. P-values 
are based on bootstrap quantiles (see Appendix A for details). The reference level for 
choice is Coin, for information is the full condition, and for salience is the salient 
condition.†††  
 Log-odds  ML SE  Bootstrap SE  p 
(5,5)        
Intercept 0.02  0.37  0.39  .963 
Limited 1.84  0.69  1.72  .0007 
Private 1.50  0.55  0.72  .0009 
Non-Salient -0.07  0.48  0.48  .913 
(8,2)        
Intercept -0.89  0.45  0.47  .0380 
Limited 2.83  0.71  1.73  .0001 
Private 1.66  0.59  0.76  .0011 
Non-Salient 0.86  0.50  0.53  .0777 
 
                                                 
††† Thus, for example, the predicted probability of choosing (5,5) in the limited condition 
and salient treatment is exp(.02+1.84)/(exp(0) + exp(.02+1.84) + exp(-.89+2.83)) = .45. 
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Table 3. Normative expectations of Responders. Each cell contains the proportion 
(fraction) of Responders who indicated that the choice was fair. 
  Choice 
Condition  5,5  8,2 Coin 
Full  96.4% 27/28  14.3% 4/28 64.3% 18/28 
Private  96.4% 27/28  17.9% 5/28   
Limited  96.4% 27/28  14.3% 4/28 57.1% 16/28 
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Table 4. Multinomial logit model of information and beliefs about Responders’ 
normative expectations as predictors of choices. The model was selected via a stepwise 
search (AIC = 166.83). 
 Log-odds  p 
(5,5)    
Intercept -13.34  .144 
Limited 0.86  .318 
Private -0.03  .958 
ϕ (5,5) 14.99  .131 
ϕ (coin) -2.33  .048 
ϕ (8,2) 0.89  .587 
    
 (8,2)    
Intercept 4.95  .176 
limited 2.64  .002 
private 2.87  .05 
ϕ (5,5) -7.21  .068 
ϕ (coin) 0.55  .663 
ϕ (8,2) 3.11  .068 
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Table 5. Rejection rates and frequencies by offer source, offer, and condition. 
 Offer  
Offer: (5,5)  (8,2)  
Full      
Direct 0.0% 0/20  23.1% 3/13  
Coin 0.0% 0/16  0.0% 0/4  
Private 0.0% 0/28  40.0% 10/25  
Limited 0.0% 0/20   18.2% 6/33   
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Figure 1. Choice proportions of (5,5), (8,2), and coin in each level of Information x 
Salience. Error bars are bootstrap estimates of one standard error of the choice 
proportion. 
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Figure 2. Boxplots of beliefs about normative expectations in the full information 
condition. Responders’ mean beliefs were 97.0%, 12.6%, and 63.6%, for (5,5), (8,2), and 
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Figure 2.  P-values, adjusted p-values, 
and 95% lower coverage regions for 
difference scores corresponding to 
hypotheses (1)-(9). Each difference score 
is the difference between predicted 
probabilities from the multinomial logit 
model – for example, πˆ {coin, full, control} - 
max( πˆ {coin, private, control}, πˆ {coin, limited, 
control}) for (1) which will be positive when 
the probability of coin is higher in the full 
condition than in the private or limited 
conditions.¶
Deleted: 3
 40 
Coin, respectively. Proposers’ mean beliefs were 96.6%, 14.9%, 65.0%. 
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Figure 3. Boxplots of beliefs about normative expectations in the private information 
condition. Responders’ mean beliefs were 98.1% and 16.0%, for (5,5) and (8,2), 
respectively. Proposers’ mean beliefs were 99.1% and 12.5%. 
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Figure 4. Boxplots of beliefs about normative expectations in the limited information 
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condition. Responders’ mean beliefs were 96.0%, 10.0%, and 54.4%, for (5,5), (8,2), and 
Coin, respectively. Proposers’ mean beliefs were 98.8%, 17.6%, 49.3%. 
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Figure 5. Predicted probability of (8,2) as a function of the Proposer’s estimate of the 
proportion of Responders who considered a) (8,2) fair, and b) Coin fair, by condition. For 
each graph, the other beliefs are held fixed at their median values. 
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Figure 6. Predicted probability of Coin as a function of the Proposer’s belief about 
Responders’ normative expectations by condition. The other beliefs are held fixed at their 
median values. 
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We summarize our predictions below. Let π {x, y, z} denote the proportion of 
choice x in information condition y and salience treatment z. 
 
Hypotheses (1) – (6). Choice proportions follow a social norm in which (5,5) and coin are 
viewed as fair, but (8,2) is not, for both the control and salient conditions:  
π {coin, full, control} > max(π {coin, private, control}, π {coin, limited, control}) (1) 
π {coin, full, salient} > max(π {coin, private, salient}, π {coin, limited, salient}) (2) 
π {(5,5), private, control} > max(π {(5,5), full, control}, π {(5,5), limited, control}) (3) 
π {(5,5), private, salient} > max(π {(5,5), full, salient}, π {(5,5), limited, salient}) (4) 
π {(8,2), limited, control} > max(π {(8,2), private, control}, π {(8,2), full, control}) (5) 
π {(8,2), limited, salient} > max(π {(8,2), private, salient}, π {(8,2), full, salient}) (6) 
 
Hypotheses (7) – (9). Choice proportions reflect normative focus in salient vs. control 
sessions: 
π {coin, full, salient}  > π {coin, full, control} (7) 
π {(8,2), limited, control}  > π {(8,2), limited, salient} (8) 
π {(5,5), private, salient}  > π {(5,5), private, control} (9) 
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Table 1. Choices by Information x Salience. Percentages and fractions correspond to each 
row in the table. S stands for the salient condition, N for non-salient condition, and T for 
the total. 
  Choice 
  5,5  8,2  Coin 
S 42.9% 12/28  17.9% 5/28  39.3% 11/28 
N 32.0% 8/25  32.0% 8/25  36.0% 9/25 Full 
T 37.7% 20/53  24.5% 13/53  37.7% 20/53 
          
S 57.1% 16/28  32.1% 9/28  10.7% 3/28 
N 44.0% 11/25  44.0% 11/25  12.0% 3/25 Private 
T 50.9% 27/53  37.7% 20/53  11.3% 6/53 
          
S 46.4% 13/28  42.9% 12/28  10.7% 3/28 
N 24.0% 6/25  76.0% 19/25  0.0% 0 Limited 
T 35.8% 19/53  58.5% 31/53  5.7% 3/53 
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